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Does banking market power contribute to the formation of non-financial industries populated by 
few, large firms, or does it instead enhance industry entry? Theoretical arguments could be made 
to support either side. The banking industry of European Union (EU) countries has been 
significantly deregulated in the early 1990s. Under the old regime, cross-border expansions were 
heavily constrained, while after deregulation banks from EU countries have instead been allowed 
to branch freely into other EU countries. Concurrently to the process of deregulation, European 
banking industries have also experienced a significant process of consolidation. Exploiting such 
significant innovations affecting the banking industries of EU countries, this paper explores 
whether changes in bank competition have in fact played a role on the market structure of non-
financial industries. Empirical evidence is derived from a panel of manufacturing industries in 29 
OECD countries, both EU and non-EU members, adopting a methodology that allows controlling 
for other determinants of industry market structure common across industries, across countries or 
related to time passing. The evidence suggests that the overall process of enhanced competition in 
EU banking markets has lead to markets in non-financial sectors characterized by lower average 
firm size. 
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This paper analyzes the effect of bank deregulation and bank concentration on the market 
structure of non-financial sectors. The focus on Europe is justified by the significant 
structural changes of the banking industry witnessed in European Union (EU) countries 
during the 1990s. Similar to the U.S. own experience over the same period of time, the 
number of banks in operation has reduced substantially in many European countries, a 
process that may have had an important impact on banks’ competitive conduct. At the 
same time, and in an effort to more toward a single, competitive market for financial 
services, EU countries have also implemented significant banking deregulation, 
culminated in 1993 with the passage of the Second Banking Coordination Directive. 
Before the enforcement of the new regulation, cross-border expansions were subject to 
the authorization and subsequent control of the host country, as well as to capital 
requirements. Under the current regime, banks from EU countries can instead branch 
freely into other EU countries. By removing substantial barriers to entry, the new 
legislation specifically aimed at generating significant improvements in the competitive 
conditions of financial markets.
1 This study estimates the effect of bank concentration 
and bank deregulation on the market structure of non-financial industries, using a panel 
of both EU and non-EU member countries. 
A growing body of research work has been devoted in recent years to analyzing the role 
played by financial markets in real economic activity. The theoretical conjecture that 
                                                 
1 Empirical evidence consistent with this prior is provided, for instance, in Angelini and Cetorelli, (Forthcoming).   3
financial markets should matter for economic growth is hardly recent, tracing back at 
least to Schumpeter (1912). The contemporary empirical work is also inspired by the 
previous contributions of Goldsmith (1969), Gurley and Shaw (1967), and McKinnon 
(1973). The revival of this literature in the last decade was inspired in large part by the 
fact that extensive and reliable cross country data sets had become available in the 1980’s 
(e.g., Penn World Tables), and by the lingering theoretical debate about the actual 
importance of financial markets for real economic activity. The work that has followed, 
e.g. King and Levine (1993 a,b), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Levine and 
Zervos (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Levine, Loayza and Beck (2002) and many 
others, has provided robust empirical evidence that broader, deeper financial markets are 
strongly associated – causally - with better prospects for future economic growth.  
Having established this basic finding, the research effort is now focused on the analysis 
of the mechanisms  through which finance affects growth: what are the specific 
characteristics of financial markets that seem to be associated with lower or higher 
growth prospects? For example, does it matter whether banks are privately or government 
owned (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2001), or whether there is higher or 
lower protection for financial contracts (Levine, 2000), or whether banks are in a more or 
less competitive environment (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996, Cetorelli and Gambera, 
2001)? And related to this, just what aspects of firms and industries are impacted by 
finance so that it eventually translates into more economic growth?  
This paper focuses on addressing precisely this last question and it is the natural 
continuation of a research agenda in which I explore the role of banking market structure   4
on the market structure of industrial sectors.
 2   
In recent years, much theoretical and empirical work has examined the economic role of 
banking market power. Challenging the customary view that a lack of competition in the 
banking industry is unequivocally detrimental to social welfare, authors have suggested 
that concentration of market power may in fact enhance the role of banks as information 
producers in their lending activity and their willingness to establish close lending 
relationships with their client firms.
3  
This paper contributes to a new dimension of analysis, investigating the effect of bank 
concentration on the market structure of industrial sectors: does concentration of market 
power in the banking industry lead banks to concentrate funding toward a few firms of 
large size, or does bank concentration foster entry of new firms over the life cycle of an 
industry, thus contributing to maintaining an unconcentrated market structure? For this 
purpose, the innovations that have taken place across EU banking markets make a good 
example of a case study where to apply empirical methodologies characteristic of 
“natural experiments” type of settings. 
 
The role of banking market structure on the market structure of industrial sectors has not 
received much attention so far in the mainstream economic literature. Scattered evidence 
is found in the work of history scholars. For example, in his study of Italian 
industrialization in the late nineteenth century, Cohen (1967) describes how a quasi-
                                                 
2 This paper is closely related to Cetorelli (2001) where I have developed the basic rationale behind the relationship 
between banking and non-financial industry market structure.  
3 See, e.g., Pagano (1993) and Guzman (2000) for theoretical arguments suggesting that banking market power reduces 
equilibrium credit, thereby generating a negative effect on economic growth. Petersen and Rajan (1995), Shaffer 
(1998), Cao and Shi (2000), Dell’Ariccia (2000), Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2000), Cetorelli and Peretto (2000) 
identify instead potentially positive effects associated with banking market power.   5
monopolistic banking industry “...led to the emergence of concentration of ownership and 
control in the new and rapidly growing sectors of the industrial structure”. Capie and 
Rodrik-Bali (1982) note that the intense process of consolidation and increase in 
concentration that characterized British banking in the early 1890’s preceded that 
experienced later on by manufacturing industrial sectors. Similarly, Haber (1997) and 
Maurer and Haber (2002), report a very close connection between bank and industry 
concentration in mid- to late-nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century Mexico. The 
general impression from historical studies that bank concentration should be associated 
with concentrated industries is finally expressed by Cameron (1967) in his renowned 
study on banking in the early stages of industrialization, where he states that 
“...Competition in banking is related to the question of competition in industry. In general 
the two flourish – and decline – together. Whether this phenomenon is a joint by-product 
of other circumstances, or whether it results from the decline or restriction of competition 
among banks, is a matter worthy of further research. It is a striking coincidence, in any 
case, that industrial structure – competitive, oligopolistic, or monopolistic – tends to 
mirror financial structure.”  
 
What are the economic mechanisms through which a characteristic of the banking 
industry such as its market structure should have anything to do, possibly in a causal 
sense, with the market structure of industrial sectors? While a formal theoretical model 
focusing on this relationship is still missing, we can delve on the existing literature on the 
economic role of banking market structure to formulate alternative theoretical 
conjectures. To this end, the framework proposed by Petersen and Rajan (1995)   6
represents a good foundation from which to ponder the role of banking market structure 
on the market structure of non-financial industries. Petersen and Rajan argue that young 
and unknown firms have easier access to credit if banks have market power. In their 
reasoning, banks with market power fund young firms with the expectation that they will 
be capable of extracting future rents once those firms eventually become profitable. 
Following their reasoning one could argue that banks with market power, pursuing their 
goal of profit maximization, should always attempt to select the best available pool of 
entrepreneurs, thus favoring new entrants along the entire life cycle of an industry. This is 
because new entrants are potentially endowed with higher return projects and more 
innovative technologies that would guarantee ever increasing profit-sharing opportunities 
for the banks.  
Yet, maintaining the same premises in the Petersen and Rajan model, it is also legitimate 
to envision completely different economic forces at play, which could lead to opposite 
conclusions. The basic argument in Petersen and Rajan relies on the formation of long-
time lending relationships and on the value that inheres to such relationships for the bank. 
The latter is represented in their work by the present value of the future stream of profits 
of those firms the bank originally helped start up, firms that eventually become the 
industry incumbents. A possible theoretical “tension” embedded in this argument lies in 
the fact that the profitability of the older bank clients (and thus the bank’s own 
profitability) will be affected by the entry of new firms. In recent papers, Cestone and 
White (Forthcoming) and Spagnolo (2002) have presented theoretical frameworks in 
which existing lending relationships do indeed affect the behavior of lenders vis-à-vis 
potential new borrowers. The less competitive the conditions in the credit market, the   7
lower the incentive for lenders to finance newcomers. Hence, financial market 
competition can represent a form of barrier to entry in product markets.
4 This theoretical 
argument would then suggest that bank concentration should enhance industry 
concentration. 
  
Judging by the formulation of these alternative conjectures, the effect of bank 
concentration on industry market structure is therefore theoretically ambiguous. 
Empirical evidence presented in a series of recent papers indicate that in fact higher bank 
concentration and more banking market power are associated with higher industry 
concentration. Cetorelli (2001) provides evidence that bank concentration leads to larger 
average firm size in non-financial sectors. Cetorelli and Strahan (2003) show that the 
effect is not only limited to an impact on the first moment of the size distribution but that 
higher bank concentration and market power have an impact on the entire distribution of 
firm size. With a focus on the entire industry life-cycle dynamics, Cetorelli (2003) show 
evidence that more bank concentration implies less entry and thriving of younger firms 
and also delayed exit of older firms. Finally, using cross-country, firm-level data, Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2003) find evidence that more bank concentration is 
associated with more financing obstacles, especially for smaller firms. 
 
This paper gathers empirical evidence on the effect of changes in banking market 
structure on average firm size in 27 manufacturing sectors in 28 OECD countries over 
time. It confirms that sectors where incumbents are more dependent on external sources 
                                                 
4 This work is itself based on contributions to the issue of product market competition, such as Brander and Lewis 
   8
of finance have a disproportionately larger average firm size if they are in countries with 
a more concentrated banking industry. The evidence also indicates that such an effect of 
bank concentration on industry market structure is substantially reduced, if not reverted, 
for countries after becoming members of the European Union. Moreover, the EU-specific 
industry deregulation associated with the implementation of the Second Banking 
Directive has also lead to less concentrated non-financial industries. 
 
2. Methodology and data 
This section describes the empirical model used to identify the effects of bank 
concentration and bank deregulation on firm size and provides detailed information on 
the data set.  
Kumar, Rajan and Zingales (2001) identify several industry-specific and country-specific 
factors as possible determinants of industry firm size. For instance, the degree of capital 
intensity, the amount of employed human capital and the R&D intensity are all possible 
characteristics, among many others, that are likely to affect an industry’s market 
structure. Likewise, the quality of the judicial system, the set of laws and regulation, the 
level of economic and financial development are some of those “environmental” factors, 
common across industries in a country, which are also likely determinants of firm size. 
Identifying the overall effect on firm size of bank concentration (or bank deregulation), 
which varies by country and over time, would inevitably raise important concerns 
regarding the possibility of reverse  causality and omitted variable biases. This problem is 
well-understood now in the literature on finance and real economic activity (see, e.g., 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1986), Chevalier (1995), Kovenock and Phillips (1995, 1997), Maksimovic (1988).   9
Rajan and Zingales, 1998).  
The effect of bank concentration on firm size can still be identified, however, measuring 
the differential effect across industrial sectors, absorbing the common effect to all sectors 
(of bank concentration and any other factor with both country and time variability) 
through the inclusion of vectors of indicator variables. More precisely, identification can 
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Average firm size is measured for each sector j, in country i and time t. The above 
mentioned common effect is absorbed by  it α , a vector of indicator variables capturing 
the country*time specific component of firm size, while  j β  is a vector of indicator 
variables capturing the industry-specific component of firm size. The effect of bank 
concentration is identified by the term of interaction with an industry-specific variable 
measuring the level of dependence from external sources of finance of incumbent firms. 
The argument is that if bank concentration has any effect on firm size, this effect should 
be especially noticeable on those sectors where incumbent firms are still in need of 
external sources of funds: As Rajan and Zingales (1998) observed, industrial sectors 
differ from one another, for technological reasons, in terms of the degree of dependence 
on external sources of finance. For example, sectors such as Tobacco, Food, or Beverages 
have much lower needs for external funding than sectors such as Machinery or 
Professional and Scientific Equipment. What is also true is that external financial   10
dependence varies with the age profile of a firm. That is, when young, firms in almost all 
sectors display a positive need for external funds, while they maintain such needs at later 
stages in the life cycle only in a fraction of sectors
5. Now, from the theoretical 
underpinnings illustrated above, we gather that bank concentration may play a role in 
industries’ market structure in that banks in concentrated markets may choose to privilege 
their older clients. Indeed the conjecture is about competition for funding between 
industry incumbents and newer entrants. Hence, in sectors where incumbents are not 
dependent on external funding there will not be any competition for resources with 
entrants, and bank concentration should not matter much as a determinant of firm size in 
those sectors. If there is any effect to pick up in the data, we should find evidence of it by 
focusing on those sectors where in fact old firms, the incumbents, are still in need for 
external funds and therefore compete for them with the younger firms.  
Consequently, if bank concentration means more favorable lending conditions for older 
firms, then we should expect that average firm size in sectors where old, incumbent firms 
are still in need for external finance will be disproportionately larger, all else equal, in 
countries with high bank concentration (the estimate of the coefficient δ  will be positive 
and significant). The opposite would be true if instead bank concentration creates better 
lending conditions for the younger firms. Note that since it has variability across all three 
dimensions, the term of interaction is identifiable even in the presence of the vectors of 
indicator variables. 
In the same model specification, the following term of interaction identifies the 
differential effect of bank concentration in EU countries, and it is the product of the first 
                                                 
5 In our dataset, 16 out of 26 sectors display a positive need for external finance for mature firms.   11
term of interaction with a dummy equal one for EU countries, from the year they become 
members. 
Average firm size is measured either as the natural logarithm of the ratio of value added 
and number of establishments, or as the natural logarithm of the ratio of total 
employment and number of establishments, both for each sector j, in country i and time t. 
The data on manufacturing sectors at three-digit, second-revision ISIC level of 
disaggregation for 29 OECD countries is extracted from a data set put together by the  
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). The time series 
availability varies by country but it spans from 1980 to 1997. Both value added and total 
employment are common indicators of firm size, and both possibly superior measures 
with respect to an indicator of output production (see, again, Kumar, Rajan and Zingales, 
2001, p. 10-11). The UNIDO data set does not provide any more detailed information 
within an industry in a country than the number of operating establishments, i.e. the plant, 
or factory where production occurs. Hence, our measure of firm size is proxied by the 
average size of an industrial establishment. This may imply some measurement error in 
our dependent variable induced by the fact that large firms often own many 
establishments.  However, the existence of a close correlation between the number of 
establishments and the number of firms has been documented in Cetorelli (2001) for a 
cross-section of countries. Similarly, the rate of creation of new businesses is correlated 
with the share of new establishments in a local economy (Black & Strahan, 2002).   
Bank concentration measures the 3-firm ratio in each country i and time t, and it is 
multiplied by an indicator variable equal to one for sectors where mature firms (more 
than 10 years old) have above-median level of dependence on external sources of finance.   12
The cross-country data on bank concentration is from Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) 
and it spans from 1990 to 1997. The data on external financial dependence is instead 
from Rajan and Zingales (1998). It is measured on U.S. listed companies and it is 
computed as the fraction of capital expenditure not financed with cash from operations, 
as an average over the 1980-1990 decade.
6  
 
The competitive effect associated with the implementation of the Second Banking 
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where bank deregulation is an indicator variable which takes value one for those 
European countries that are members of the European Union, either after 1993 (the year 
the Second Banking Directive was implemented) or after the country becomes a member 
of the EU, whichever comes later.
7 The improvement in competitive conditions in EU 
banking markets after deregulation should have an opposite impact on average firm size 
than that of bank concentration identified with model (1). More precisely, if bank 
concentration implies a larger average firm size in sectors where old firms are still 
dependent on external finance, an improvement in bank competition via deregulation 
                                                 
6 Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that the “dependence of U.S. firms on external finance [is] a good proxy for the 
demand for external funds in other countries” (Rajan and Zingales (1998), p. 563–65). 
7 Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherland joined the EU from its inception in 1950. 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined in 1973, Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, Austria, 
Finland and Sweden in 1995. In addition to its 15 current Member States, the EU is preparing for the accession of other 
13 eastern and southern European countries.   13
should imply easier access to credit for industry entrants and therefore a lower average 
firm size.  
In both models I have also included, as additional control variable, the share of total 
manufacturing value added for each sector j, country i and time t, also constructed using 
the UNIDO data set. In studies of cross-sector industrial growth, the share of total 
manufacturing value added consistently predicts that sectors that had grown substantially 
in the past, and therefore are already relatively large, grow less in the future (see Rajan 
and Zingales, 1998 and Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001). Moreover, theories of an 
industry’s life-cycle predict that a sector that has already grown substantially should 
experience less intensive firm entry (see Klepper [15]). Hence, the share variable controls 
for the stage in industry life-cycle a sector is in, and specifically it should capture the 
different intensity in entry due to life-cycle specific reasons: all else equal, a larger and 
more mature sector should be expected to have a larger average firm size. 
To further sharpen the identification strategy, I have also included terms of interaction 
between external financial dependence of incumbent firms and variables proxying for the 
stage of development of various sectors of the financial industry. One could make the 
argument, for example, that bank concentration or banking regulation evolves as a 
function of the stage of development the overall financial industry is in. If that were the 
case, then the bank concentration interaction term, or the bank deregulation one, could be 
picking up the effect associated with other variables, unrelated to the theoretical priors 
under investigation. The additional terms of interaction were between external financial 
dependence and bank development, proxied by the ratio of private credit by deposit banks 
and other financial institutions to GDP, stock market development, proxied by the stock   14
market turnover ratio, and bond market development, proxied by the ratio of private bond 
market capitalization to GDP. Data on these three additional variables was also gathered 
from Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001). 
Table 1 shows the pattern of average firm size and bank concentration across countries 
and Table 2 the pattern of average firm size and external financial dependence across 
industrial sectors.  
 
3. Empirical results 
 1. The effect of bank concentration on industry market structure 
  
Table 3 presents the first set of results where I estimated the differential effect of bank 
concentration across industries, for all countries without distinction between EU and non-
EU members. These estimations were obtained to verify the degree of consistency with 
those in Cetorelli (2001). The main difference was that in Cetorelli (2001) the data set 
included a cross-section of manufacturing industries in OECD countries but without a 
time series dimension. The dependent variable is either the logarithm of value added over 
number of establishments or the logarithm of total employment and number of 
establishments.  
In all regressions the share of value added variable is consistently positive and 
significant, as a priori expected. As reported in the first two columns, irrespective of the 
choice of dependent variable, bank concentration appears to have a positive and 
significant effect on industry market structure. The average firm size of sectors where 
older firms are still dependent on external finance is significantly larger in countries 
characterized by high bank concentration. To offer an indication of the economic   15
significance of such effect, let us focus on the results in the second column. A sector 
where older firms are still dependent on external finance will have an average firm size 
about 3 % larger than a sector where older firms are not dependent on external finance if 
bank concentration were to increase from the first to the third quartile of its distribution. 
Considering that the unconditional absolute difference in firm size between high- and 
low-dependence sectors is about 2.5 %, such an impact determined by a change in bank 
concentration is economically significant. 
The third and fourth columns present estimation results where the interaction terms with 
proxies for financial markets development were included. The bank concentration 
interaction term maintains sign and significance. Incidentally, two of the three additional 
regressors are significant with a negative sign. This is actually economically sensible: one 
would expect that as financial markets develop, access to external finance improves thus 
making younger firms more likely to enter, and therefore contributing the average firm 
size to be, all else constant, smaller.  
The last two columns report additional regression results where I restricted the sample to 
European countries only (both EU and non-EU members). The results show that the 
coefficient of the bank concentration interaction is actually larger in magnitude and still 
significant.  
The results of this first table are therefore consistent with theoretical priors suggesting 
that banks with market power may have the tendency to preserve relationships with their 
older clients, which grow larger, at the expense of potential new entrants. This result is 
also (reassuringly) consistent with that obtained in Cetorelli (2001). 
Next, I have tested whether the effect of bank concentration would be different for   16
European countries once they become members of the European Union. To a great 
extent, EU states can be considered as having a higher degree of homogeneity, defined in 
terms of common implementation of EU-wide directives and commitment to common 
policies of open markets. The EU membership may thus result in a competition-
enhancing effect. Consequently, for EU-member countries defining bank concentration 
on the basis of national boundaries may become unsuitable. Table 4 presents the results 
of regressions including a differential term of interaction for EU member countries. The 
estimated coefficient for this term is consistently negative across all specifications, 
although it is not significant in two of the specification where firm size is measured in 
terms of value added. The results overall indicate that EU membership is associated with 
a more overall competitive environment. In this environment, potential industry entrants 
are less constrained by the financial barrier to entry that a concentrated banking market 
may represent. Bank concentration thus indeed loses relevance for EU-member countries. 
So, for example, focusing on the results reported in the second column, the differential 
effect on firm size of bank concentration in EU-member countries is only half the 
magnitude than that for the other countries in the control group. 
 
2. The effect of bank deregulation 
 
Last, I have tested the direct effect of the implementation of the Second Banking 
Directive. As described in introduction, such piece of EU-wide deregulation of the 
banking industry removed important barriers to entry in banking markets, thus 
contributing to enhance the overall level of bank competition in EU countries. Table 5 
presents the results of regressions where I have included an interaction term between the   17
external financial dependence variable with a dummy equal one for EU countries after 
1993, when the Second Banking Directive was implemented, or after the year a country 
became member of the EU, whichever comes later. As the results indicate, this term of 
interaction is negative and it is significant for all but two of the regressions, again, two of 
those where the dependent variable is measured in terms of value added. The overall 
indication is, however, that following deregulation, EU banking markets have become 
more competitive and this seems to have been translated into easier entry and less 





This paper has contributed to investigate a new dimension of analysis of the economic 
role of bank concentration and competition. The results show that sectors where old firms 
are more in need of external finance are of disproportionately larger size if they are in 
countries whose banking sector is more concentrated.  
This result is consistent with theoretical priors suggesting that market power gives banks 
an implicit equity stake in the firms with whom they have already established long lasting 
relationships. The evidence also seems to imply that bank market power may represent a 
financial barrier to entry in non-financial industries.  
The results have also shown, however, that such effect of bank concentration is 
substantially weakened in EU-member countries, indicating that in the more 
                                                 
8 One should remark, however, that the data set does not extend too many years after 1993 (it ends in 
1997). Hence one should refrain from making strong statements based on this data set about the long-run 
overall effects of changes in bank competition on the market structure of non-financial industries, a 
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“competition-proned” environment of the European Union firms have easier access to 
funds, thus reducing the influence of bank concentration on the market structure of non-
financial industries. Similarly, the empirical evidence also suggests that pro-competitive 
deregulation of the banking industry, such as the EU-wide implemented Second Banking 
Directive, has contributed to reduce the average firm size of non-financial sectors. 
To the extent that changes in bank competition leads to more or less concentrated 
industries, this analysis exposes a potential link between characteristics of the banking 
industry and firms’ conduct in other industrial sectors. For example, depending on market 
structure, firms may have different pricing strategies for their products or different 
incentives for technology adoption. Therefore, regulation that directly affects the market 
structure of the banking industry will also have effects, perhaps undesirable, down the 
line in non-financial product markets. These considerations point to novel directions of 
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   Table 1: Average Firm Size and Bank Concentration Across Countries
Country Ln(va/no.est.) Ln(Emp./no.est.) Bank Concentration
Australia 14.33775 3.68393 .6482356
Austria 14.98726 4.495798 .7219185
Belgium 13.98336 3.562576 .6476625
Canada 15.00872 4.137156 .5837914
Czech Republic 12.0781 5.734251 .8646001
Denmark 14.45874 3.673602 .7437906
Finland 14.91703 4.242352 .8828248
France .414438
Germany West 15.81104 5.053391 .4549705
Greece 13.70816 3.84133 .7693471
Hungary 14.70301 6.073357 .6998351
Iceland 12.67111 2.2798 1
Ireland 14.07746 3.756913 .7350337
Italy 14.77086 4.179225 .3562633
Japan 14.5518 3.369591 .2170099
Korea, Rep. 14.1841 3.878878 .3126329
Luxembourg 14.63149 4.231299 .3838012
Mexico 15.84689 5.9216 .5836384
Netherlands 15.49991 4.736675 .7380463
New Zealand 12.99911 2.794762 .6939822
Norway 14.50926 3.914007 .8405356
Poland 15.41152 6.503342 .5034863
Portugal 13.22094 3.681847 .4578493
Spain 13.57518 3.199897 .4737538
Sweden 15.21361 4.441467 .8831108
Switzerland .7590806
Turkey 14.85739 4.9535 .4376526
United Kingdom 14.41054 3.814538 .5565007
United States 15.12917 4.056541 .1864721
Bank concentration is the sum of market shares (measured in total assets) of the three
largest banks in each country. The data on individual banking institutions varies by
country but it spans for the period 1990-1997. The values reported are averages over the
sample period. The figures for firm size are calculated as simple averages for each
country across all industries and over time.Table 2: Average Firm Size and External Financial Dependence
Across Industrial Sectors
Isic Sector Ln(va/no.est.) Ln(Emp./no.est.) External
Dependence
311 Food 14.08678 3.888206 -0.0520653
313 Beverages 15.38108 4.436783 -0.1463893
314 Tobacco 17.15729 5.618409 -0.3754666
321 Textiles 13.99757 4.031199 0.1410054
322 Wearing Apparel 13.25029 3.618692 -0.0201083
323 Leather 13.24073 3.306214 -1.330175
324 Footwear 13.61598 3.947371 -0.5728263
331 Wood Products 13.14599 3.173224 0.2491902
332 Furnitures and Fixtures 13.15987 3.260224 0.329176
341 Paper and Products 15.00423 4.544604 0.1043816
342 Printing and Publishing 13.82034 3.555834 0.1358248
351 Industrial Chemical 15.71694 4.910531
352 Other Chemicals 15.06287 4.365358 -0.1836157
353 Petroleum Refineries 17.72687 5.888985 -0.0217111
354 Petroleum and Coal Products 14.53268 3.792876 0.1620249
355 Rubber Products 14.86087 4.552456 -0.1225661
356 Plastic Products 13.9431 3.727345
361 Pottery, China etc. 14.06791 3.984686 0.1633804
362 Glass and Products 14.73027 4.338665 0.0310358
369 Non-Metallic Products 14.13102 3.668588 0.1519385
371 Iron and Steel 15.73547 5.272175 0.0870939
372 Non-Ferrous Metals 15.27572 4.781541 0.0731368
381 Metal Products 13.71522 3.604358 0.0437072
382 Non-Eletrical Machinery 14.28047 4.027712 0.2166062
383 Electrical Machinery 14.92107 4.603697 0.2300215
384 Transport Equipment 14.99909 4.767653 0.1632407
385 Professional Goods 14.15431 3.979891 0.1936534
390 Other Manufacturing 13.31041 3.263575 -0.0513038
The figures for firm size are calculated as simple averages for each sector across all
countries and over time. External financial dependence relates to mature companies (more than
ten years old), and is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with cash flow from
operations. It is measured on U.S. listed companies during the 1980’s.Table 3: Effect of Bank Concentration on Average Firm Size 
 
  Average firm size measured in terms of 
             




Share value addedijt  1.596***  1.412***  1.777***  1.252***  1.705***  1.180*** 
  [0.165]  [0.137]  [0.183]  [0.157]  [0.219]  [0.188] 
Bank concentrationit * Old   0.424***  0.381***  0.320***  0.330***  0.563***  0.568*** 
firms external dependencej  [0.103]  [0.088]  [0.116]  [0.099]  [0.167]  [0.143] 
Bank developmentit * Old       -0.208***  -0.119***  -0.327***  -0.229*** 
firms external dependencej      [0.052]  [0.044]  [0.084]  [0.071] 
Stock market developmentit * Old       -0.136**  -0.023  0.032  0.133* 
firms external dependencej      [0.066]  [0.057]  [0.089]  [0.076] 
Bond market developmentit * Old       0.039  0.079  0.032  0.072 
firms external dependencej      [0.130]  [0.112]  [0.146]  [0.125] 
             
Observations  2867  2857  2678  2665  1814  1800 
R-squared  0.78  0.66  0.79  0.67  0.77  0.67 
             
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of either value added or total employment divided by the total number of 
establishments in sector j, country i and year t. Share value added is the fraction of value added of sector j, country i, at time 
t over total manufacturing value added in country i at time t. Bank concentration is the 5-firm ratio for the banking industry of 
country i at time t. Old firms external financial dependence is a dummy equal to one for sectors where mature firms (> 10 years old) 
have above-median needs for external sources of funding. Bank development is the ratio of private credit by deposit banks and other 
financial institutions to GDP, stock market development is the stock market turnover ratio and bond market development is the ratio 
of private bond market capitalization to GDP. All regressions were performed including a vector of industry dummies and a vector of 
country*year dummies but coefficients are not reported. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at  1%. 
         
             Table 4: Effect of Bank Concentration on Average Firm Size. 
Differential Effect for EU Member Countries 
 
  Average firm size measured in terms of 
             




Share value addedijt  1.595***  1.409***  1.779***  1.257***  1.701***  1.178*** 
  [0.165]  [0.137]  [0.183]  [0.157]  [0.219]  [0.187] 
Bank concentrationit * Old   0.433***  0.407***  0.326***  0.343***  0.482***  0.452*** 
firms external dependencej  [0.103]  [0.088]  [0.116]  [0.099]  [0.171]  [0.146] 
Bank concentration EUit * Old   -0.062  -0.193***  -0.105  -0.191***  -0.209**  -0.306*** 
firms external dependencej  [0.075]  [0.065]  [0.078]  [0.067]  [0.095]  [0.081] 
Bank developmentit * Old       -0.216***  -0.133***  -0.293***  -0.177** 
firms external dependencej      [0.052]  [0.044]  [0.085]  [0.072] 
Stock market developmentit * Old       -0.146**  -0.039  -0.001  0.085 
firms external dependencej      [0.067]  [0.057]  [0.091]  [0.077] 
Bond market developmentit * Old       0.059  0.112  0.029  0.066 
firms external dependencej      [0.131]  [0.112]  [0.146]  [0.125] 
             
Observations  2867  2857  2678  2665  1814  1800 
R-squared  0.78  0.66  0.79  0.67  0.77  0.67 
             
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of either value added or total employment divided by the total number of 
establishments in sector j, country i and year t. Share value added is the fraction of value added of sector j, country i, at time 
t over total manufacturing value added in country i at time t. Bank concentration is the 5-firm ratio for the banking industry of 
country i at time t. Old firms external financial dependence is a dummy equal to one for sectors where mature firms (> 10 years old) 
have above-median needs for external sources of funding. Bank concentration EU is the product of bank concentration and a dummy 
equal one for EU member countries (starting in the year they become members). Bank development is the ratio of private credit by 
deposit banks and other financial institutions to GDP, stock market development is the stock market turnover ratio and bond market 
development is the ratio of private bond market capitalization to GDP.  In the last two columns, the data set was restricted to 
European countries only, both EU and non-EU members. All regressions were performed including a vector of industry dummies and a 
vector of country*year dummies but coefficients are not reported. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at  
1%.           
             Table 5: Removal of Barriers to Entry in EU Banking Markets 
 
  Average firm size measured in terms of 
             




Share value addedijt  2.800***  1.902***  1.828***  1.291***  1.644***  1.143*** 
  [0.140]  [0.114]  [0.193]  [0.165]  [0.224]  [0.190] 
Bank deregulationit * Old   -0.159***  -0.213***  -0.039  -0.157***  -0.099  -0.276*** 
firms external dependencej  [0.049]  [0.041]  [0.057]  [0.049]  [0.079]  [0.067] 
Bank developmentit * Old       -0.226***  -0.127***  -0.184**  -0.089 
firms external dependencej      [0.055]  [0.047]  [0.083]  [0.069] 
Stock market developmentit * Old       -0.167**  -0.025  -0.044  0.098 
firms external dependencej      [0.070]  [0.060]  [0.091]  [0.077] 
Bond market developmentit * Old       0.075  0.114  0.066  0.117 
firms external dependencej      [0.133]  [0.113]  [0.150]  [0.127] 
             
Observations  7853  7839  2540  2531  1738  1728 
R-squared  0.73  0.62  0.78  0.66  0.76  0.66 
             
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of either value added or total employment divided by the total number of 
establishments in sector j, country i and year t. Share value added is the fraction of value added of sector j, country i, at time 
t over total manufacturing value added in country i at time t. Bank deregulation is a dummy equal to one for EU member countries 
based on the following rule: Max{year=1993, year=year country joins EU}.  Old firms external financial dependence is a dummy equal 
to one for sectors where mature firms (> 10 years old) have above-median needs for external sources of funding. Bank development is 
the ratio of private credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions to GDP, stock market development is the stock market 
turnover ratio and bond market development is the ratio of private bond market capitalization to GDP. All regressions were 
performed including a vector of industry dummies and a vector of country*year dummies but coefficients are not reported. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at  1%.           
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